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THE DOG DAYS SHOULD BE OVER: THE INEQUALITY 
BETWEEN THE PRIVACY RIGHTS OF APARTMENT 
DWELLERS AND THOSE OF HOMEOWNERS WITH RESPECT 
TO DRUG DETECTION DOGS 
ABSTRACT 
 
Recent judicial opinions throughout the country have muddied the wa-
ters concerning the extent of privacy rights protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment beyond the walls of an individual’s home.  More specifically, courts 
have drawn a distinction between an apartment dweller’s privacy rights and 
the privacy rights of a homeowner concerning drug detection dogs.  In Flor-
ida v. Jardines, the Supreme Court of the United States held the use of a drug 
detection dog on a front porch violates the homeowner's constitutional rights.  
In State v. Nguyen, the North Dakota Supreme Court followed the Eighth and 
other federal circuit courts to distinguish a common apartment building from 
a home.  The Nguyen court held law enforcement officers' investigation using 
drug detection dogs in a secured common hallway was neither a trespass nor 
a violation of the expectation of privacy.  This Note will discuss the history 
and extent of the Fourth Amendment’s protections, the history of the use of 
dogs in investigation, and the Fourth Amendment protections concerning 
drug detection dogs.  In addition, this Note will argue that both homeowners 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Note will discuss the history and purpose of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the role of drug detection dogs in law enforcement investigations to-
day, and the inequality of Fourth Amendment protections concerning dog 
sniffs outside the door of homeowners versus individuals living in an apart-
ment or multi-family dwelling.  After examining Fourth Amendment protec-
tions of dog sniffs with respect to different living situations, this Note will 
advocate for equal constitutional protections for homeowners and apartment 
dwellers from warrantless searches involving drug detection dogs. 
II.  THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HISTORY AND PURPOSE 
Over the past century, the United States Supreme Court has frequently 
considered the extent of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.  The Fourth 
Amendment reads:  
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.1 
 
This section will discuss the extension of Fourth Amendment protections 
beyond the walls of a home and the standards for Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. 
A. CURTILAGE - FOURTH AMENDMENT EXTENDS BEYOND THE WALLS 
OF THE HOME 
The concept of curtilage being within the constitutionally protected area 
of an individual’s home originated under the open fields doctrine.  The first 
relevant case concerning open fields and curtilage was United States v. Hes-
ter.2 In Hester, the appellant was convicted of violating Prohibition statutes 
by concealing moonshine.3  The appellant claimed the search that led to his 
conviction violated his Fourth Amendment rights because law enforcement 
officers trespassed onto private property.4  The Court held that since the 
moonshine was in an open field, the search did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.5  Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes birthed the open fields doc-
trine, stating, "the special protection accorded by the Fourth Amendment to 
the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects,' is not extended to 
the open fields."  Justice Holmes provided further support for the open fields 
doctrine by stating "[t]he distinction between [the open field] and the house 
is as old as the common law.”6  However, he did not define open field or 
curtilage, which posed issues in the application of the new rules by courts 
and law enforcement.7 
Shortly after Hester, the Court attempted to define curtilage in Olmstead 
v. United States.8  In Olmstead, the Court determined the degree of actual 
 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
2. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). 
3. Id. at 58. 





8. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
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physical intrusion would be the dispositive test in residential searches and 
seizures challenged under the Fourth Amendment.9  The Court declared only 
a “physical invasion of [an individual's] house “or curtilage’”would fall un-
der the scope of the Fourth Amendment.10 
In 1984, after the Court decided Katz,11 the open fields doctrine was re-
vived in Oliver v. United States.12  Rather than analyzing each open-fields 
case individually under the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test, the 
Court implemented a bright line rule.13  This bright line rule stated that “an 
individual has no legitimate expectation that open fields will remain free 
from warrantless intrusion by government officers.”14  The Court also deter-
mined the area “immediately surrounding and associated with the home,” 
also known as the curtilage, is “part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment 
purposes.”15  Thus, areas outside of the home and curtilage were determined 
to be per se excluded from the protection of the Fourth Amendment.16  
Three years after the Court decided Oliver, the Court echoed the revital-
ization of the open fields doctrine in United States v. Dunn.17  The Court 
recognized that prior case law did not provide insight into determining where 
constitutionally protected curtilage ends and constitutionally unprotected 
open fields begin.18  Therefore, the Court set forth four factors for determin-
ing whether an area is constitutionally protected curtilage.19  The Dunn fac-
tors include (1) the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, 
(2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, 
(3) the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and (4) the steps taken to 
protect the area from observation by people passing by.20 
B.  STANDARDS FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS  
Over the course of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the United States 
Supreme Court has utilized two theories to determine whether the Fourth 
Amendment applies.  This section will discuss the common law trespass the-
 
9. Id. at 466. 
10. Id. 
11. See infra note 40. 
12. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
13. Id. at 181. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 180. 
16. Id. at 183-84. 
17. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987). 
18. Id. at 301. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
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ory that was the only test used until 1967.  In addition, this section will dis-
cuss the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test announced in 1967 in Katz 
v. United States. 
1. Common Law Trespass Theory 
In 1928, the common law trespass theory was introduced in Olmstead v. 
United States.21  In Olmstead, federal officers obtained information via an 
intercepted phone conversation regarding a possible violation of the National 
Prohibition Act.22  Importantly, the federal agents who intercepted the phone 
conversation did not enter the defendant’s premises.23  Rather, the agents 
tapped the conversations from the basement of a large office building and on 
public streets.24  The majority of the Court took a literal approach to the text 
of the Fourth Amendment, and held that only a “physical invasion of [an in-
dividual’s house ‘or curtilage’] constituted a Fourth Amendment search.”25  
The phone wiretaps were installed on public lines outside the defendant’s 
property; thus, the wiretaps were not a physical intrusion.26  Accordingly, the 
Court determined the federal agents did not violate the defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.27 
After Olmstead, several cases followed the common law trespass theory, 
including Goldman v. United States, On Lee v. United States, and Silverman 
v. United States.  First, in Goldman, government agents obtained evidence 
after installing a detectaphone in the wall of the defendant’s office.28  The 
Court found there was no physical trespass; thus, the search did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment.29  Next, in On Lee, a wired informant working for 
the government entered the defendant’s store and engaged him in conversa-
tion.30  During the conversation, the defendant made incriminating admis-
sions that were heard and testified to by a government agent.31  Subsequently, 
the defendant challenged the testimony as violating his Fourth Amendment 
 
21. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. 
22. Id. at 456. 
23. Id. at 457. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 466 (stating “The Fourth Amendment . . . [is not] violated . . . unless there has been 
an official search and seizure of [an individual’s] person, or such a seizure of his papers or 
his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curtilage’ for the 
purpose of making a seizure.”). 
26. Id. 
27. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. 
28. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 131-32 (1942), overruled in part by Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
29. Id. at 134-35. 
30. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 749 (1952). 
31. Id. 
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rights.32  The Court held there was no physical trespass because the informant 
entered with the defendant’s consent and the information was transmitted to 
an agent outside the shop.33  Therefore, the defendant’s Fourth Amendment 
rights were not violated.34  Finally, in Silverman, the police gained consent 
from an adjacent building’s owner to use as an observation post to investigate 
whether the defendant’s premises was the headquarters of a gambling opera-
tion.35  In the observation post, the officer installed a “spike mike” listening 
device that was wedged in the heating duct of the defendant’s house.36  After 
officers testified to the defendant’s incriminating statements at trial, the de-
fendant argued the testimony violated his Fourth Amendment rights.37  The 
Supreme Court held the means by which law enforcement procured the state-
ment was a “physical penetration” into the defendant’s premises.38  Thus, the 
physical intrusion constituted a violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amend-
ment rights.39 
Six years after Silverman was decided, the Supreme Court announced a 
new Fourth Amendment standard in Katz v. United States.40  This standard 
will be more thoroughly discussed in the next section.  Many people thought 
Katz did away with the common law trespass test as discussed by the Rakas 
v. Illinois Court.41  The Rakas majority said:  
 
 [i]n the course of repudiating the doctrine derived from Olmstead v. 
United States, . . . the Court in Katz held that capacity to claim the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property 
right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims 
the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the invaded place.42 
 
However, in 2012, forty-six years after the Supreme Court decided Katz, 
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in United States v. Jones.43  In Jones, 
 
32. Id. 
33. Id. at 751. 
34. Id. 
35. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506 (1961). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 508. 
38. Id. at 509. 
39. Id. at 511-12. 
40. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
41. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). 
42. Id. (citations omitted). 
43. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012). 
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the defendant was under investigation for suspicion of trafficking narcotics.44 
In the process of the investigation, law enforcement procured a warrant au-
thorizing them to attach a Global Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device 
to the defendant’s vehicle to monitor his movements within ten days.45  After 
the expiration of the warrant, law enforcement attached the device while the 
defendant’s car was parked on a public street.46  The trial court applied the 
Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test and denied the defendant’s mo-
tion to suppress.47  The defendant appealed asserting the unwarranted attach-
ment of the GPS device violated his Fourth Amendment rights.48  The Court 
applied the common law trespass test to determine the placement of the GPS 
device on the defendant’s car was a physical intrusion on his property; thus, 
it was a Fourth Amendment search.49  Further, the Supreme Court held even 
though the Court had gone away from using the physical intrusion standard 
for some time, the Katz test of “reasonable expectation of privacy” supple-
mented, but did not replace, the common law trespass test.50 
2. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Until the latter half of the twentieth century, the Court required a physi-
cal intrusion or common law trespass for a Fourth Amendment violation.  
However, in 1967, the Court did away with this approach and determined 
physical intrusion was not required for a Fourth Amendment violation.51  In 
Katz, law enforcement attached an electronic eavesdropping device to the 
outside of a telephone booth.52  The conversations picked up by the device 
contained information that led to the petitioner’s arrest and were permitted to 
be introduced at trial.53  Both parties argued the Olmstead constitutionally 
protected area approach, but the Court disregarded the approach.54  Rather, 






48. Id. at 949. 
49. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954. 
50. Id. at 953 (“[W]e do not make trespass the exclusive test. Situations involving merely 
the transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analy-
sis.” (also see Knotts and Kyllo discussing the supplementary nature of the Katz test rather 
than the replacement of the common law trespass test.)). 
51. Katz, 389 U.S. at 347. 
52. Id. at 348. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 349-50. 
55. Id. at 351 (“[T]his effort to decide whether or not a given ‘“area,”‘ viewed in the abstract, 
is ‘“constitutionally protected’” deflects attention from the problem presented by this 
           
668 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:661 
More specifically, the Court declared that the proper analysis centers on 
whether the search or seizure “violate[s] the privacy upon which [the peti-
tioner] justifiably relied.”56  Accordingly, what a petitioner would justifiably 
expect to preserve as private constitutes a constitutionally protected area sub-
ject to Fourth Amendment protections, even if it is publicly accessible.57  The 
Court determined that for the purposes of Fourth Amendment protection, a 
constitutionally protected area need not be private property that the govern-
ment must physically intrude to gain access.58 
The current standard did not originate in the majority opinion.  Rather, 
in his concurrence, Justice Harlan described the well-known twofold “rea-
sonable expectation of privacy” requirement.59 Thus, to be considered a 
“search” for Fourth Amendment purposes, the government must both (1) ex-
hibit an actual subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) the expectation must 
be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.60  It is important 
to remember, the Katz test of “reasonable expectation of privacy” did not 
replace the common law trespass test; rather, it provided an additional avenue 
to determine whether an area is constitutionally protected.61 
III. DOG SNIFFS IN INVESTIGATIONS 
Law enforcement’s use of dogs originated in Belgium in 1899.62  Over 
fifty years later, in 1957, the first successful organized canine unit was im-
plemented in the United States.63  Shortly after, in 1970, the United States 
Customs Service began using dogs to detect drugs.64  Since then, drug detec-
tion dogs have become commonplace in the United States.65  Dogs can be 
trained to detect and alert authorities to the presence of heroin, marijuana, 
 
case. For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly ex-
poses to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the 
public, may be constitutionally protected.” (internal citations omitted)). 
56. Id. 
57. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 360-61 (J. Harlan concurring). 
60. Id. at 361. 
61. Id. at 953 (“[W]e do not make trespass the exclusive test. Situations involving merely the 
transmission of electronic signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.” (also see 
Knotts and Kyllo discussing the supplementary nature of the Katz test rather than the replacement 
of the common law trespass test.)). 
62. Shannon R. Hurley-Deal, State v. Fisher: Canine Sniffs – Who Let the Dogs Out?, 26 N.C. 
CENT. L. J. 47, 47 (2003).  
63. Id. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 51. 
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cocaine, and other drugs.66  In fact, in the United States, drug detection dogs 
have proven so successful, they are employed in many airports, bus stations, 
and border locations.67  
Dogs are useful to law enforcement because of their exceptionally pow-
erful olfactory sense, also known as sense of smell.68  Dogs have up to three 
hundred million olfactory receptors compared to six million in humans.69  Put 
another way, “[i]f laid out, the surface area of a dog's olfactory cells would 
cover a space equivalent to the skin area of the dog's body. In comparison, 
the surface area of human olfactory cells would cover no more than a postage 
stamp.”70  Thus, proportionally speaking, the portion of a dog’s brain devoted 
to smell is about forty times greater than that of a human brain.71  Throughout 
the United States, the “play-reward” method is widely used to train drug-
detection dogs.72  The Supreme Court of Oregon described the commonly 
used method in State v. Foster73 stating: 
 
The dogs are trained to detect heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, 
and marijuana. Initially, the handler exposes the dog to a training 
aid such as a tennis ball that has been submerged in the drug and 
familiarizes the dog with the odor by playing with it. Then the 
trainer hides the ball, and the dog learns to sniff it out. Next, the 
trainer hides the drug rather than a tennis ball. When the dog finds 
the drug, it is rewarded by being allowed to play with a favorite 
toy.74  
 
The dogs and their handlers are then tested to determine if they are suf-
ficiently accurate to become certified.75  The court in Foster described the 
testing procedure as follows: 
 
 




69. Peter Tyson, Dogs’ Dazzling Sense of Smell, (Oct. 2012), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/nature/dogs-sense-of-smell.html.  
70. Hurley-Deal, supra note 62, at 51. 
71. Peter Tyson, supra note 69. 
72. See State v. Foster, 252 P.3d 292, 295 (Or. 2011). 
73. Id. (The Foster court looked to the training of drug-detecting dogs to determine whether 
the dog in question in the case was adequately trained in comparison to the commonly used “play-
reward” method).  
74. Id. (quoting State v. Foster, 225 P.3d 830, 835 (Or. Ct. App. 2010)). 
75. Foster, 252 P.3d at 295. 
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After the dog and the handler have worked together for a significant 
period of time, they are eligible for testing . . . [T]the test involves 
[testing the dog's ability to detect the presence of drug-scented items 
in two rooms, three vehicles, seven packages, and an open area. To 
prevent handler cuing and to force the teams to perform under stress, 
the handler does not know how many items, if any, the dog should 
alert to on each deployment.] Each environment may have up to 
three drug packages hidden in it, or may have none at all. The envi-
ronments also have distractors, such as dirty clothing and urine. [To 
pass the portion of the test in rooms and vehicles, a dog must have 
at least a 90 percent accuracy rate. For the packages and open area, 
the dog must be 100 percent accurate.] Approximately 25 percent of 
the dogs fail the test. If a dog passes the test, it is certified for one 
year and must complete the test again to be recertified.76  
 
The constitutionality of using drug detection dogs in law enforcement 
has been challenged in state and federal courts.77  Notably, in United States 
v. Place the Supreme Court found dog sniffs of the exterior of luggage to be 
constitutional.78  In Place, drug enforcement agents detained the defendant at 
an airport and used a drug detection dog to sniff his luggage.79  The Court 
found a brief seizure of the luggage to perform a dog sniff was appropriate 
and did not amount to a Fourth Amendment search because it did not involve 
physically opening or exposing the defendant’s items.80  In addition, the 
Court noted the sniff was solely designed to reveal the presence of contra-
band.81  Therefore, the Court concluded the sniff was not a Fourth Amend-
ment search.82 
Many years later, in 2005, the Supreme Court was faced with another 
case concerning a warrantless drug detection dog search in Illinois v. Ca-
balles.83  In Caballes, law enforcement conducted a lawful traffic stop of the 
respondent’s vehicle for speeding.84  While the first state trooper wrote out a 
warning ticket for the defendant, a second trooper arrived on the scene with 




78. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). 
79. Id. at 699. 
80. Id. at 707. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 405 (2005). 
84. Id. at 406. 
85. Id. 
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dog alerted to the presence of marijuana in the respondent’s trunk.86  Subse-
quently, the troopers searched the trunk, found marijuana, and the respondent 
was convicted with a drug offense.87  The Supreme Court granted certiorari 
to determine whether the Fourth Amendment required reasonable, articulable 
suspicion to justify a dog sniff of a vehicle during a lawful traffic stop.88  The 
Court held the dog sniff did not implicate legitimate privacy interests because 
it was performed on the exterior of the car during a legitimate traffic stop.89  
The Court determined “[a]ny intrusion on respondent's privacy expectations 
[does] not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable infringement.”90 
In sum, with respect to drug detection dogs, prior to Florida v. Jardines, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that dog inspection of luggage in an airport 
and dog inspection of an automobile during a lawful traffic stop do not violate 
the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” standard.  Thus, dog sniffs, in 
the contexts listed above, are not searches under the scope of the Fourth 
Amendment.  The next section will discuss the Jardines91 case, where the 
Court first considered the application of prior dog sniff decisions in the con-
text of the home. 
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS OF DRUG DOG SNIFFS 
IN HOMES AND APARTMENTS 
The protection of the Fourth Amendment varies depending on an indi-
vidual’s living situation.  Per case law, homeowners have been given more 
constitutional protection than their apartment dwelling counterparts concern-
ing the area outside their door.92  This section will look at the legal back-
ground of homeowner’s Fourth Amendment rights as discussed by the Su-
preme Court in Florida v. Jardines.  Additionally, this section will discuss 
the current law surrounding Fourth Amendment protections of individuals 
living in apartments and multi-family dwellings. 
A. HOMEOWNER’S RIGHTS: FLORIDA V. JARDINES 
One year after Jones, the Supreme Court was faced with a similar Fourth 
Amendment argument in Florida v. Jardines.93  In Jardines, law enforcement 
 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 406-07. 
88. Id. at 407. 
89. Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409. 
90. Id. at 409. 
91. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
92. Compare Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1409 with United States v. Eisler, 567 F.2d 814, 816 (8th 
Cir. 1977) (holding no reasonable expectation of privacy in an apartment hallway). 
93. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417. 
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took a drug detection dog to the defendant’s front porch without a warrant.94  
The dog positively alerted officers to the presence of drugs.95  Subsequently, 
law enforcement used the information to procure a warrant to search the 
home, during which they found illegal drugs and charged the defendant ac-
cordingly.96  The trial court suppressed the evidence finding it was a warrant-
less search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.97  On appeal, the Supreme 
Court agreed, holding the front porch was constitutionally protected curti-
lage,98 officers did not have an implied license to be there with drug detection 
dogs,99 and law enforcement physically intruded on the constitutionally pro-
tected area in violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.100  
In the Court’s finding that the porch was curtilage, it did not reach an 
analysis of the Dunn factors.101  Rather, the Court looked to the Oliver 
Court’s standard, which states “[w]hile the boundaries of the curtilage are 
generally ‘clearly marked,’ the ‘conception defining the curtilage’ is at any 
rate familiar enough that it is ‘easily understood from our daily experi-
ence.’”102  Thus, the Court determined the front porch is undoubtedly curti-
lage because it is an area where it is obvious that “the activity of home life 
extends.”103 
After determining the front porch was curtilage, the Court looked to 
whether the officer acted reasonably, or if it was an unlicensed physical in-
trusion.104  The Court discussed that a police officer without a warrant “may 
approach a home and knock, precisely because that is ‘no more than any pri-
vate citizen might do.’”105  While the Court recognized this implied warranty, 
it drew a line expressing there is no “customary invitation” to introduce “a 
trained police dog to explore the area around the home in hopes of discover-
ing incriminating evidence.”106  Therefore, the Court determined the officer’s 
conduct was beyond the scope of the license implied to an individual seeking 
to utilize the porch to attempt an entry.107 
 




98. Id. at 1415. 
99. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417. 
100. Id. at 1417-18. 
101. Id. at 1414-15. 
102. Id. at 1415 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182, n.12 (1984) (internal 
quotations omitted)).  
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 1415.  
105. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 (citing Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 469 (2011)).  
106. Id.  
107. Id. at 1417. 
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Accordingly, the Court determined law enforcement’s conduct was an 
unlicensed intrusion on a constitutionally protected area, the defendant’s cur-
tilage, which was a similar situation to Jones.108  Thus, the Court reiterated 
the holding in Jones stating “[w]hen ‘the Government obtains information by 
physically intruding’ on persons, houses, papers, or effects, ‘a ‘search’ within 
the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment has ‘undoubtedly oc-
curred.’”109  The Court determined the officer’s use of drug detection dogs to 
investigate the home on the front porch is a “search” within the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights.110 
Justice Kagan, along with Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor, con-
curred with the majority decision, and provided an analysis of the Jardines 
case on privacy grounds.111  Justice Kagan determined the search was unrea-
sonable under both a property and privacy analysis.112  She stated the Kyllo 
v. United States Court established a “firm” and “bright” rule that is applicable 
in this case.113  The standard reads: “[w]here as here, the Government uses a 
device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that 
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the sur-
veillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a war-
rant.”114  Justice Kagan determined drug detection dogs are not “in general 
public use” and the dogs were used to “explore details of the home that they 
would not otherwise have discovered without entering the premises.”115  
Therefore, Justice Kagan argues absent a warrant or exigent circumstance, 
the search is unreasonable under a privacy analysis.116 
B. APARTMENT DWELLER’S RIGHTS  
Unlike homeowners, there is no set standard for Fourth Amendment pro-
tection of the area outside the door of individuals living in apartments or 
multi-family dwellings.  This section will discuss the federal circuit split on 
the issue.  Additionally, this section will discuss two cases relevant to North 
 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 1414 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, at 406 n.37 (2012)). 
110. Id. at 1417-18. 
111. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1418 (Kagan, J. concurring). 
112. Id. at 1418-19. 
113. Id. at 1419. 
114. Id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding a search is unreasonable 
when law enforcement committed no trespass, but used a thermal-imaging device to detect heat 
emanating from a private home)); see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717-18 (1984) 
(holding warrantless beeper-assisted surveillance inside a home is unreasonable).  
115. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1419 (Kagan, J. concurring).  
116. Id. at 1419-20. 
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Dakota law concerning Fourth Amendment protections in common hallways 
of multi-family dwellings:  State v. Nguyen and United States v. Matthews. 
1. Federal Circuit Split Regarding the “Reasonable Expectation 
of Privacy” in Common Areas of Multi-Family 
Dwellings 
The Federal Circuits are split concerning whether there exists an objec-
tively reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of multi-family 
dwellings.  The Majority view does not recognize a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the common areas for tenants in an apartment or multi-family 
dwelling. 117  On the other hand, the Minority view recognizes such a right 
under certain circumstances discussed below.118 
The Majority view, consisting of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, 
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, have consistently held that indi-
viduals living in multi-family dwellings do not have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the common or shared areas.119  Most relevant, the Eighth Cir-
cuit has found no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in a duplex vesti-
bule,120 duplex hallway closet,121 multi-family dwelling basement storage 
locker accessible to all residents,122 the landing of a secure apartment build-
ing,123 and a conversation taking place in a secure apartment building com-
mon hallway.124  In addition, prior to the Jardines decision, other Circuits 
have found no legitimate expectation of privacy in a condominium parking 
garage,125 common hallways of a secured apartment building, 126 and com-
mon areas of apartment buildings.127  Also, many states, such as Tennessee, 
Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania, have followed this 
view.128 
Alternatively, the Second and Sixth Circuit do not agree.  The Sixth Cir-
cuit’s minority view has recognized a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the hallway or common areas of an apartment when an officer enters without 
 
117. State v. Nguyen, 2013 ND 252, 841 N.W.2d 676, 680. 
118. Id. at 680-81 (citing United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545, 550 (6th Cir. 1976)). 
119. Id. at 680.  
120. See United States v. Mendoza, 281 F.3d 712, 715 (8th Cir. 2002). 
121. See United States v. McCaster, 193 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 1999). 
122. See United States v. McGrane, 746 F.2d 632, 634 (8th Cir. 1984). 
123. See United States v. Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1980). 
124. See Eisler, 567 F.2d at 816. 
125. See United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir. 1976). 
126. See United States v. Holland, 755 F.2d 253, 255 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Acosta, 
965 F.2d 1248, 1253 (3rd Cir. 1992); United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir. 1993). 
127. See United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1172 (7th Cir. 1991). 
128. Nguyen, 2013 ND 252, ¶ 9, 841 N.W.2d 676. 
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permission and the building is locked.129  The court stated, “[a]ny entry into 
a locked apartment building without permission, exigency, or a warrant is 
prohibited [by the Fourth Amendment].”130  Additionally, the Second Circuit 
found there is a “heightened expectation of privacy inside [a] dwelling” and 
held the use of drug detection dogs in the hallway of a locked apartment 
building constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.131  The Minority view 
would afford Fourth Amendment protection to apartment dwellers from war-
rantless drug detection dog searches in the common hallways of the building 
similar to the protection afforded to homeowners under Jardines.  
2. North Dakota Relevant Post Florida v. Jardines Cases  
Recently, there have been two relevant cases decided concerning drug 
detection dogs in common hallways of apartments.  The first, State v. Nguyen, 
was decided by the North Dakota Supreme Court.  The second, United States 
v. Matthews, originated in Minnesota and was appealed to the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
First, in Nguyen, law enforcement received a report of marijuana odor 
on the second floor of an apartment building.132  The controlled access apart-
ment building had secured common hallways where personal property, like 
shoes, bikes, and door decorations, were present.133  While investigating the 
apartment building, ununiformed officers caught the door behind a tenant of 
the apartment and brought in a drug detection dog to walk it through the se-
cond floor.134  The dog was drawn to the defendant’s door and alerted to the 
presence of drugs.135  The information from the dog was used to obtain a 
search warrant, and as a result, incriminating evidence was gathered.136  The 
trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress, and the State appealed 
to the North Dakota Supreme Court arguing the use of a drug detection dog 
in secured apartment common hallways did not amount to an unconstitutional 
search.137  
The defendant argued the use of the dog was a physical intrusion into the 
defendant’s constitutionally protected area under Jardines.138  The Court dis-
regarded this argument because the common hallway outside of an apartment 
 
129. See, e.g., Carriger, 541 F.2d at 550. 
130. See United States v. Heath, 259 F.3d 522, 534 (6th Cir. 2001).  
131. United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985). 
132. Nguyen, 2013 ND 252, ¶ 2, 841 N.W.2d 676. 
133. Id. at ¶ 3. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at ¶ 4. 
137. Id. at ¶ 6. 
138. Nguyen, 2013 ND 252, ¶ 12, 841 N.W.2d 676. 
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is distinguishable from the area surrounding a home because of the much 
lower legitimate expectation of privacy in common hallways.139  Thus, the 
common hallway is not within the curtilage of the defendant’s apartment.140  
Ultimately, the Court looked to Eighth Circuit precedent establishing that the 
common hallways of multiple-family dwellings did not enjoy a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.141  Therefore, the Court determined the dog sniff in 
the defendant’s apartment hallway was not an illegal Fourth Amendment 
search.142 
In Matthews, a recent Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, law en-
forcement received a report implicating the defendant as a suspect in multiple 
crimes.143  The defendant lived in a “large, secure apartment building, to 
which the owner had granted police all-hours access by placing a key in an 
outdoor box.”144  As a result, on two occasions, police went to the defendant’s 
building with a drug detection dog to conduct a drug sniff in the common 
hallway.145  The dog alerted to the officers the presence of drugs outside the 
defendant’s apartment door.146  The information from the dog sniff was used 
to procure a warrant to search the defendant’s apartment where incriminating 
evidence was found leading to the defendant’s indictment.147  Subsequently, 
the defendant filed a motion to suppress, and the district court denied the 
motion.148 
On appeal, the defendant argued the positive alerts constituted “warrant-
less searches in violation of [the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights]” un-
der Jardines.149  The Court did not reach the question posed by the defend-
ant’s argument because binding precedent existed in the Eighth Circuit to 
which law enforcement could have reasonably relied.150  Prior case law pro-
vided with respect to an officer’s reasonable reliance on binding circuit prec-
edent sanctioning such drug dog sniffs, “the exclusionary rule did not pre-
clude the use of that evidence in search-warrant application.”151  Thus, the 
 
139. Id. at ¶ 13. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. at ¶ 9.  
142. Id. at ¶ 13. 






149. Matthews, 784 F.3d at 1235. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. 
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Court upheld the denial of the motion to suppress without reaching the ques-
tion of whether the dog sniff was a Fourth Amendment search under 
Jardines.152 
V. ARGUMENT 
After analyzing information applicable to the use of drug detection dogs 
near places of living, an inequality of constitutional protections for home-
owners versus apartment dwellers exists.  This section will discuss three rea-
sons that the same constitutional protection that extends to the front porch of 
a home should apply to the common hallways of an apartment building.  
Therefore, warrantless searches would constitute a violation of the apartment 
dweller’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
First, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common hall-
ways of a secured apartment building, which satisfies the Katz standard and 
demands constitutional protection.  Notwithstanding precedent in some juris-
dictions that determined common hallways in apartment buildings do not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy, a secured door that restricts access 
to an apartment building in and of itself demonstrates a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.  The locked door serves as a barrier to accessing the building 
for non-tenants and uninvited guests.  This shows a constitutionally protected 
interest in privacy and security by preventing strangers from meandering 
about the hallways, even police accompanied by drug detection dogs.  Re-
stricting access to the building is a reasonable demonstration of an expecta-
tion of privacy.  Thus, the Katz standard has been satisfied, and a warrantless 
search of the area should be deemed unconstitutional.  
Moreover, using drug detection dogs near the entrance of a dwelling 
should be presumptively unreasonable because they are not in general public 
use and are used to explore details of the dwelling that law enforcement could 
not perceive unassisted.  In the Jardines concurring opinion, Justice Kagan 
analyzed the case using the “firm” and “bright” line rule announced in Kyllo.  
Under this analysis, Kyllo should directly apply to a warrantless search using 
drug detection dogs, regardless of the type of dwelling.  The use of a dog 
trained to detect drugs should not be considered “in general public use” be-
cause of their unique training and ability to detect and respond to specific 
scents.  In addition, law enforcement agents use the highly trained dogs to 
determine the existence of things that “would previously have been unknow-
able” but for the use of the drug detection dogs.  Given the firm and bright 
line rule announced in Kyllo, the use of drug detection dogs on any dwelling, 
 
152. Id. at 1235-36. 
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absent a search warrant or exigent circumstances, should constitute an unrea-
sonable search in violation of the homeowner or apartment dweller’s Fourth 
Amendment rights.   
Finally, the common hallway of an apartment building should be con-
sidered curtilage, and in turn, should be protected similar to the constitution-
ally protected front porch in Jardines.  An analysis of the Dunn factors should 
indicate the hallways of an apartment building, especially around the door 
frame, are curtilage.  The Dunn factors include (1) the proximity to the home, 
(2) whether the area is included within the enclosure surrounding the home, 
(3) the nature of the area’s use, and (4) steps taken to protect observation the 
area from observation by people passing by.153  
The first Dunn factor applies because the secured apartment hallway is 
right outside the entrance to the apartment.  With respect to the second factor, 
the hallways are enclosed by the walls of the apartment building; thus, the 
hallways are within the area protected by the locked door which secures ac-
cess to the building.  The third factor applies because the nature of the area’s 
use is first, foremost, and arguably exclusively to access apartment units.  
This is the same purpose as a front porch to a home.  In addition, the area 
immediately outside an apartment door often contains personal items such as 
welcome mats and door signs facing the hallway.  Thus, the nature of the 
area’s use is similar to that of a porch, which has been deemed constitution-
ally protected curtilage.  Finally, the fourth factor applies because there have 
been clear steps taken to prevent observation.  The building is secured and 
restricts access to those who do not have keys; thus, the only people that have 
access to the common hallway are those who live there and their invited 
guests.  
After analyzing the Dunn factors with respect to common hallways of 
secured apartment buildings, the common hallways should be considered cur-
tilage.  Therefore, following Jardines, the area should be constitutionally pro-
tected.  This constitutional protection would provide equal privacy rights to 
the area directly outside the entrance to a living situation, no matter whether 
the individual chooses to live in an apartment or a detached home. 
A deciding factor between an individual choosing between living in an 
apartment or a house should not be differing constitutional protections from 
drug-sniffing dogs.  There is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the com-
mon hallways of a secured apartment building.  Moreover, the area outside 
an apartment door should be considered constitutionally protected curtilage.  
Thus, the constitutional rights of both homeowners and apartment dwellers 
 
153. United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). 
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to “retreat into [their] own home[s] and there be free from unreasonable gov-
ernmental intrusion”154 should apply equally. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Overall, this Note explored the relevant Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence that the Supreme Court and other courts have utilized in arriving at 
decisions concerning the constitutionality of drug-detecting dog sniffs.  Such 
doctrines consist of the open fields doctrine, including the importance of de-
ciphering the extent of a home’s curtilage, and the standards for Fourth 
Amendment protection, including the common law trespass test and the Katz 
“reasonable expectation of privacy test.”  In addition, this Note explores the 
unique qualifications of law enforcement dogs and the Supreme Court’s prior 
case law regarding dog sniffs.  Finally, this Note considers the inequality be-
tween homeowners Fourth Amendment protections under Jardines, and that 
of apartment dwellers concerning the areas outside their respective doors.  It 
also advocates for equal constitutional protections for homeowners and apart-
ment dwellers alike.  
 




154. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001). 
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